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Abstract
We study a first price auction preceded by a negotiation stage,
during which bidders may form a bidding ring. We prove that in the
absence of external effects the all-inclusive ring forms in equilibrium,
allowing ring members to gain the auctioned object for a minimal
price. However, identity dependent externalities may lead to the for-
mation of small rings, as often observed in practice. Potential ring
members may condition their participation on high transfer payments,
as a compensation for their expected (negative) externalities if the ring
forms. The others may therefore profitably exclude such ”demanding”
bidders, although risking tougher competition in the auction. We also
analyze ring inefficiency in the presence of externalities, showing that
a ring may prefer sending an inefficient member to the auction, if the
efficient member exerts threatening externalities on bidders outside
the ring, which in turn leads to a higher winning price.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are known as a common trading mechanism. In order to suppress
competition, increase the chances of winning and reduce the winning price,
bidders may try to collude, namely to form a cartel or a bidding ring. A cartel
in which all bidders participate may seem as the efficient way to operate,
since it totally eliminates competition and allows bidders to win the good for
a minimal price. Nevertheless, the presence of externalities may introduce
inefficiencies and disturb full cooperation.
Given the fact that the largest a bidding ring is the more efficient the
collusion is, we address the question of the formation of small bidding rings,
which are often observed in practice. We wish to identify the motivation
of the all-bidders cartel to exclude certain bidders, although risking tougher
competition in the auction. We also examine the question of ring inefficiency,
namely, when a ring chooses an inefficient member to represent it in the
auction.
1.1 Partial collusion example
Consider a market consisting of four competitive firms.1 An auction is or-
ganized in order to issue a single valuable production license in this market.
Externalities are due to the pollution level that the winning firm is antici-
pated to cause.
Firms FC and F
′
C are Conservative players who operate in the market for
quite some time. Their estimated profit if winning the tender is rather low
due to the relatively old technology they possess, which also causes quite a
great deal of pollution. Therefore, if either FC or F
′
C wins the production
license, it is likely to exert significantly negative externalities on the others.
Firm FG is a young player in this market, who acts under the banner of
1Partial collusion can be demonstrated in a 3-player market as well. However, the
discussed tension between excluding over-demanding agents and decreasing competition is
more obvious as the number of agents grows. Moreover, the symmetry which is considered
in this example is not necessary for the formation of a small cartel. With respect to
the notion of ”externality matrix” which we introduce promptly, partial collusion can be
demonstrated in the non-symmetric 3-player market given by:
3 -4 0
0 1 0
0 -3 1
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conserving the environment, and may therefore exert no externalities on the
others if winning. Due to the high costs of its ”Green” technology its profit
if winning the contract is anticipated to be rather low. The last player, FH ,
is a dynamic High-tech firm with a rather high valuation for the contract in
question, who is anticipated to exert some mild externalities on the others if
winning.
If no cartel forms and all firms participate in the tender non-cooperatively,
FG is assumed to win being ready to pay a high price for the license. That is
as it fears the externality it might suffer if either FC or F
′
C wins the production
license. The latter fail to compete the aggressive bid of FG as they cannot
afford paying such a high price for the license, given their low valuations.
FH on its side would rather let FG win instead of paying an expensive price,
anticipating that the latter would exert no externalities.
Consider a state of nature where FG is drawn to be the collusion designer
in the negotiation stage which precedes the auction. Full collusion should
designate FH as the cartel bidder, since it maximizes the total welfare (high
profit, relatively low externalities). However, if indeed such a cartel is formed,
both FC and F
′
C would demand a positive transfer as a compensation for the
externality they are about to suffer, as opposed to the negotiation status-quo,
where no cartel is formed and FG wins the license, exerting no externalities.
Excluding the demanding FC and F
′
C from the proposed cartel increases
the competition in the tender. Hence, a narrower cartel, consisting of FG and
FH only, is risking high prices in the auction. However, FC and F
′
C are rather
weak competitors due to their low profit, and therefore the threat they pose
on the smaller cartel is rather tolerable. In such a setup ”partial collusion”
may be more profitable than ”full collusion”. Example 4.2 demonstrates this
scenario.
1.2 Related literature
Collusion in private value auctions without externalities was already studied
using the tools of mechanism design. McAfee and McMillan (1992) study first
price auction with independent private values, showing that the all-inclusive
bidder cartel is feasible, and that if transfers between cartel members are al-
lowed then the collusive mechanism is efficient. Graham and Marshall (1987)
and Mailath and Zemsky (1991) study collusion in second price auction with
private values, and find that partial collusion is possible. (The latter consider
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heterogeneous bidders.) Marshall and Marx (2007) and Robinson (1985)2
compare the resistance of first and second price auctions to collusion, finding
the second price auction more vulnerable.
In practice, collusion in auctions and in auction-like situations is widely
observed. Examples include Long-Island highway construction contracts
(Porter and Zona (1993)), Ohio school milk procurements (Porter and Zona
(1999)), Midwest seal coat contracts (Bajari and Ye (2003)), and U.S. oil and
gas leases federal auctions (Hendricks, Porter and Tan (2008)).3
We consider a bargaining stage before the auction during which bidders
may form a ring. As, e.g., Bloch (1996), Bloch and Gomes (2006), Ray and
Vohra (1999, 2001), we restrict our attention to a specific bargaining pro-
tocol. A complementary approach omits the specification of the bargaining
process and focuses on examining properties of the bargaining result, i.e., the
admitted partition of the society as in, e.g., Ray and Vohra (1997) and Biran
and Forges (2010). The latter apply a core notion on auctions in order to
study the stability of small cartels vs. the all-inclusive bidder cartel without
referring to the question of how a given cartel emerged.
The notion of identity dependent externalities, which plays a major role in
our paper, is taken from the work of, e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996, 1999),
Caillaud and Jehiel (1998), and Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996).
1.3 The collusion game
We consider a first price auction with complete information.4 Each bidder
assigns a positive valuation to the auctioned good, which is the utility he
derives if he wins the auction and consumes the good. Additionally, each
bidder exerts identity dependent external effects on the others if consuming
the good. Namely, each losing bidder gets a certain utility, which (possibly
negative) value is determined as a function of the identity of the winner.
We assume that the winner is obliged to consume the good, and no resale
is allowed after the auction ends. Such an assumption is reasonable, for
example, in state tenders where the winning firm has to carry out the project
in question and cannot resell the execution rights to a third party. (See,
2Robinson (1985) considers also common value auctions.
3We find the latter example particularly interesting as the considered auctions took
place in the years 1954-1970, when joint bidding ventures were legal in this market. (In
late 1975, however, Congress passed prohibiting legislation.)
4Our results can be verified in a second price auction as well.
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e.g., the South-Korean high-speed train case study in Jehiel and Moldovanu
(1996).)
The auction is preceded by a negotiation stage in which bidders may form
a bidding ring. The bargaining protocol we consider takes the following form.
One of the bidders is chosen by a chance move to be the collusion designer.
He may then address any subset of the others, offering them to form a cartel.
He designates one of the members of the proposed cartel, possibly himself,
as the representative of the cartel, or the designated cartel bidder. Finally,
he specifies a contingent transfer scheme which is implemented if the cartel
wins the good.5 If all addressed agents accept the offer then the cartel forms,
and all but the designated cartel bidder are committed to place an irrelevant
bid in the auction. Otherwise, agents act independently in the auction.
We analyze bidders’ behavior in sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. In
order to simplify the discussion we restrict our attention to pure bidding
strategies.6 Such a restriction, however, puts into question the existence of
an equilibrium bid in the auction. We handle this difficulty in appendix A
providing a characterization of first price auction equilibrium bids in pure
bidding strategies in the presence of externalities.
1.4 Main results
We start by studying, as a benchmark, an auction which takes place in the
absence of externalities. Namely, every losing bidder is indifferent, in terms of
his final utility, regarding the identity of the winner. Not surprisingly, we find
that the primary intuition holds. Bidders always form the grand coalition,
represented by the bidder with the highest valuation. As a consequence they
win the good for a minimal price, and the seller’s surplus as a whole is divided
between ring members through transfer payments.
Introducing external effects between agents changes the outcome dra-
matically. Externalities lead to a trade-off between reducing competition
and compensating some of the participating agents via transfer payments.
5Collusion case studies find that as transfer payments between cartel members are
easily tracked, cartels tend to participate in several auctions, letting each member be the
relevant bidder according to ”the phases of the moon” (see, e.g., Porter and Zona (1999),
Bajari and Ye (2003)). As we consider a single-auction setup, we use transfer payments
as motivation for cartel members to cooperate.
6The results we are presenting hold for the non-restricted case as well, where mixed
bidding strategies are allowed.
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For instance, an agent may demand a high transfer payment if he anticipates
a considerably low externality if participating in the collusion, compared to
his anticipated utility if he declines to participate. Hence, in order to avoid
paying high transfers, the collusion designer may find it optimal to exclude
”demanding” agents from the considered bidding ring, although risking a
tougher competition in the auction. We, therefore, identify externalities as
a probable cause for the formation of small bidding rings instead of the all-
inclusive one. We give an example of a market with externalities, where the
collusion designer indeed forms a small cartel in a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium.
We then move on to discuss the question of the identity of the bidding
ring representative. As mentioned above, in the absence of externalities the
bidder with the highest valuation optimally represents the all-bidder ring
in the auction. The intuition is quite clear. The bidder with the highest
valuation allows splitting the ”largest pie” among cartel members. This
intuition does not necessarily hold in the presence of externalities. We say
that an agent is the cartel efficient member if the sum of his valuation and the
externalities he exerts on other cartel members is maximal. In order to be
able to split the ”largest pie” the efficient bidder should represent the cartel.
However, the efficient bidder may happen to exert terribly low externalities
on agents outside the cartel. Such a threat translates into aggressive bids
in the auction. In turn, yielding a high winning price and reducing the
net benefit from collusion. The cartel may therefore find it optimal to be
represented by an ”inefficient” and less threatening agent.
Finally, we compare our results with Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996)’s strate-
gic non-participation. They have proved that agents may find it optimal to
commit not to participate in the auction just before it takes place. In this
way, an agent eliminates himself from being a potential consumer, hence
the externalities he may exert on others become irrelevant. Such a decision
changes the market description and may lead to a different winner in the
auction. For example, an agent may find it optimal not to participate if by
doing so he anticipates that an agent he prefers as a consumer will win the
good. We show that in our collusion game the collusion designer is strictly
better off forming an appropriate cartel rather than choosing not to partic-
ipate. Thus, allowing the designer not to participate is redundant in our
model.
The paper takes the following structure: In section 2 we present the
model of the collusion game. In section 3 we analyze agents’ behavior in the
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collusion game if no external effects exist, and prove that full collusion always
emerges in equilibrium. In section 4 we introduce externalities and show that
partial collusion may arise. In section 5 we demonstrate that in the presence
of externalities a formed cartel may prefer to be represented in the auction
by an inefficient member. Section 6 analyzes strategic non-participation in
view of the collusion game. In section 7 we study possible extensions of
our model. We obtain a characterization of equilibrium bids in first price
auctions in markets with externalities, and of weakly dominated strategies
in this setup in appendices A and B. Appndices C, D and E contain proofs
of the main propositions of sections 3, 4 and 5 correspondingly.
2 The model
2.1 First price auction with externalities
The market consists of a seller S, n ∈ N potential buyersB = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn},
and one indivisible good. Each buyer Bi assigns a valuation pii to the good
in case he consumes it. An identity dependent externality αij ∈ R, i 6= j, is
the utility to buyer Bj in case buyer Bi consumes the good. We refer to this
setup of valuations and externalities as an n× n matrix of externalities.
We consider a first price auction in this market, which the seller organizes.
All participants place simultaneously their non-negative bids. The highest
positive bid which was placed, denoted p, wins.7 The winner, denoted Bw,
pays p to the seller, consumes the good, and gets his valuation, piw. All other
agents, Bj 6= Bw, get their corresponding externality, αwj. We make the
following assumptions:
• The winner must consume the good, and no resale to another agent is
allowed.
• If the highest positive bid was placed by several agents (tie), each of
them has an equal probability of winning the good.
• If all participants place a zero-bid, the good stays in the possession of
the seller, and each agent gets a utility normalized to zero.
7We do not let the agents win the good for free, in order to allow an extension of our
model to an auction with a reserve price. With respect to the money unit , which is
defined later in this section, one may consider the first price auction we discuss, as an
auction with an -reserve-price.
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We assume that each agent in the market prefers consuming the good
rather than either having some other agent consuming it, or leaving it in the
possession of the seller, i.e. status-quo. Formally, for all Bi, pii > αji for all
j 6= i, and pii > 0.8
Following, e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996), we will assume the existence
of a smallest money unit in the market, denoted , in order to avoid problems
related to the existence of Nash equilibrium in the first price auction. In
particular, bids, valuations and externalities are discrete with respect to this
money unit. For instance, if Bi places a bid equals to bi = k, and Bj wishes
to overbid it, then Bj must bid at least bi +  = (k + 1).
Finally, we assume that the valuations and externalities are generic in the
following sense.
Definition 2.1. We will refer to a market as generic , if the following holds:
• All valuations and externalities are linearly independent with respect to
the set of coefficients {−1, 0, 1}. Namely, for any two sets of coefficients
{δi}ni=1 and {δij}i 6=j which take values in {−1, 0, 1}, if not all coefficients
are null then
n∑
i=1
δipii +
∑
i 6=j
δijαij 6= 0.
• Adding or subtracting up to (n + 2) to any of the valuations and
externalities maintains the linear independence. Namely, for any two
sets of coefficients {ηi}ni=1, and {ηij}i 6=j such that −(n+ 2) ≤ ηi, ηij ≤
(n + 2), the valuations {pii + ηi}ni=1, and externalities {αij + ηij}i 6=j,
are independent with respect to the set of coefficients {−1, 0, 1}.
2.2 Collusion
The first price auction is preceded by a negotiation process between the
potential bidders, in which they may agree to collude. One of the agents is
chosen by a chance move to be the collusion designer. He may then address
the others, and propose them a take-it-or-leave-it offer to form a cartel. He
designates one of the proposed cartel members, who will make a relevant bid
while the others place irrelevant bids. Finally, the collusion designer proposes
a configuration of transfer payments. We emphasize that the designated cartel
8Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) also assume that every agent prefers the status-quo, i.e. no
sale, over a sale to another. Formally, they assume ∀i, αji < 0 for all j 6= i.
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bidder participates in the auction as an actual player, and no fictitious player
which represents the cartel is added to the game.9 We assume the following:
• The offer is observed by all agents in B.
• By accepting the offer, all addressed agents, but the designated cartel
bidder, commit to make an irrelevant bid, namely 0, in the auction.
• If the offer is accepted, all members of the cartel commit to implement
the transfer payment scheme if the designated cartel bidder indeed wins
the auction.10
• Agents’ responses are also observed by all agents in B.
Note that the designated cartel bidder, does not commit to a specific bid,
and in particular may eventually bid zero in the auction. The probability
of every agent to be the collusion designer, is given by a probability vector,
denoted σ, which is part of the game data. Right after the addressed agents
respond to the offer, the auction takes place. Hence, the formed cartel, its
representative in the auction, and the transfer payments agreed upon among
the members of the cartel, define the state of the economy at the beginning
of the auction.
Definition 2.2. A state s in the game is the tuple (C,Bl, d) where:
• C ⊂ B
• Bl ∈ C
• d ∈ Rn such that:
– For all 1 ≤ j ≤ n there exists an integer mj such that dj = mj
– For all j /∈ C it holds that dj = 0
–
∑
j∈C
dj = 0
9See, e.g., Haeringer (2004) who considers a game between ”meta-players”, where a
”meta-player” stands for a coalition.
10We assume that if the cartel loses the auction then there is no motivation for further
cooperation. In particular, no transfer payments are made in such a case.
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The interpretation is that C is a cartel, of which Bl is the representative,
and d are transfer payments which the agents receive, if Bl wins the auction.
For the simplicity of notations we refer to d as a vector of transfer payments
to the members of the society as a whole. Transfer payments correspond to
the money unit . Surely enough, transfer payments outside the cartel are
zero. Within the cartel, transfer payments are balanced.
We denote s0 the initial state of the economy, where there is no cartel,
and no commitment to transfer payments. If the offer which the collusion
designer makes is declined by any of the addressed agents, the economy stays
in the state s0. In this case, as no cartel is formed, all agents go to the auction
as non-cooperating bidders, without any commitment to bids nor to transfer
payments. Finally, the collusion designer may prefer to leave the economy
at the initial state s0, which we refer to as negotiation status-quo.
Definition 2.3. Let s be a state. The set of relevant bidders in the state s,
denoted B(s), is given by:
• If s = s0 then B(s0) = B.
• Otherwise, let s = (C,Bl, d), then B(s) = {Bl} ∪ (B \ C).
Consider Bi as the collusion designer, we say that a proposal is a state s
such that either s = s0, or s = (C,Bl, d) and Bi ∈ C. The interpretation is
that Bi may either choose the negotiation status-quo, or may alternatively
propose to move the economy to a state s, by suggesting to form a cartel in
which he is a member.
Given the assumptions detailed above, the collusion game is the following:
• Stage 1: A collusion designer, Bi, is chosen by a chance move according
to σ.
• Stage 2: Bi makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, to move the economy to
the state s.
• Stage 3: If s = s0 the game moves to the next stage. Otherwise, if
s = (C,Bl, d), all members of C, but the designer, signal sequentially
whether they accept or reject the proposal.11 At the end of this stage,
11Assume that agents are addressed in an ascending order with respect to their indices.
As we discuss subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE), the analysis does not depend on
the order in which agents are addressed and respond. In particular, the restriction to
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if all agents accepted the proposal, then the economy moves to the new
state s. Otherwise, if at least one agent rejected the proposal, then the
economy stays at the primary stage s0, where all agents are singletons.
• Stage 4: A first price auction takes place, with respect to the established
state.
Let s = (C,Bl, d) be the state of the economy when the auction takes
place, and let b(s) be a valid bidding vector with respect to the state s. For
the sake of simplicity we assume that there is a single highest positive bid,
p, made by Bw ∈ B(s). The case where there are several winners is treated
similarly. The utility function, u(s, b(s)), is defined as follows:
• If no agent wins the good in the auction, namely b(s) = 0, then the
utility of the seller is 0, and every Bj gets uj(s, 0) = 0
• Otherwise, the seller’s utility is given by uS(s, b(s)) = p.
• If w = l then uj(s, b(s)) =

pil + dl − p if j = l
αlj + dj if j ∈ C \ {l}
αlj if j /∈ C
• If w 6= l then uj(s, b(s)) =
{
piw − p if j = w
αwj if j 6= w
Finally, we wish to consider the following definition of efficiency, as we
study the question of efficiency in equilibrium.
Definition 2.4. Let C be a cartel in a generic market. We say that Bi is
the efficient member of C if i = arg max
j∈C
(pij +
∑
l∈C\{j}
αjl). We refer to the
efficient agent as the efficient member of B.12
SPNE rules out equilibria where all agents reject because if another rejects all responses
are equivalent. Equivalently, one can consider trembling hand perfect equilibria of the
game, in which the agents respond simultaneously.
12The efficient agent in every cartel C is unique due to genericity.
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3 The zero-externality case
We start the game analysis by discussing the case where no agent exerts
externalities on the others, namely, for all i 6= j, αij = 0. We prove that in
all Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE), with pure bidding strategies
in the auction, full collusion emerges with probability one.
We emphasize that our results hold for the non-restricted case as well,
where mixed strategies are allowed. However, the analysis one should follow
is somewhat more complicated. For instance, in a generic market with ex-
ternalities the winner in equilibrium of the first price auction is not uniquely
determined (see, e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996)). Moreover, even in the
case without externalities, there are non-generic markets, where both a bid
leading to a tie between two agents, and a bid which yields one of them as a
single winner, are in equilibrium. We note, however, that considering mixed
strategies in the auction simplifies the discussion regarding the existence of
SPNE in the collusion game. One may conclude the existence of an equi-
librium of the auction game in mixed strategies, as bids are discrete, and
continue in backward induction to deduce the existence of an SPNE of the
collusion game.
We define first genericity in the 0-externality case.
Definition 3.1. A zero-externality market is considered to be generic if the
following holds:
• All valuations are linearly independent with respect to the set of coeffi-
cients {−1, 0, 1}. Namely, for any set of coefficients {δi}ni=1 which take
values in {−1, 0, 1}, if not all coefficients are null then
n∑
i=1
δipii 6= 0.
• Adding or subtracting up to (n+2) to any of the valuations maintains
the linear independence. Namely, for any set of coefficients {ηi}ni=1 such
that −(n+ 2) ≤ ηi ≤ (n+ 2), the valuations {pii + ηi}ni=1, are linearly
independent with respect to the set of coefficients {−1, 0, 1}.
We start by understanding how an agreement made by agents affects the
market description at the last stage of the game, when the auction takes
place. The relation between an agreement and the market description is
explained by transfer payments. For example, suppose that B1 and B2 form
a cartel, where B1 is the cartel bidder. In addition, suppose that they agree
that if B1 wins the good then B2 gets a transfer of x, and B1 gets a transfer of
12
−x. When going to the auction and considering his bid, B1 needs to take into
account that if indeed he wins the good and consumes it, his payoff will not
be his original valuation pi1, but his valuation fixed by his transfer payment,
namely, pi1 − x. Therefore, the relevant valuation for B1 while considering
his bid should be updated according to the agreement he is part of.
The matrix of externalities is used both to determine what bids are in
equilibrium in the auction, and to conclude agents’ utilities when the good
is consumed. Given a state, all cartel members but the cartel bidder, are
committed to bid 0. Therefore, an equilibrium of a first price auction in
this state is a function of the bids of the relevant bidders in this state only.
Namely, the cartel bidder and fringe bidders, i.e., agents outside the cartel.
Moreover, as bidding 0 cannot lead to winning the good and consuming
it, the cartel members, but the cartel bidder, are not potential consumers.
Hence, we should reduce the original matrix of valuations and externalities
to a matrix composed of the valuations and externalities of relevant bidders
only, with respect to the state in question. Hence, we start by erasing the
rows and columns of the cartel members but the cartel bidder.
We continue by updating the valuation of the cartel bidder with respect to
the agreed transfer payment. Since a valuation is defined as what an agent
gets if he wins the auction and consumes the good, and the cartel bidder
gets his transfer payment only if he indeed wins, we conclude that with
respect to the agreement, the valuation of the cartel bidder is the sum of his
original valuation and the transfer payment agreed upon. The valuations of
the other relevant bidders stay as the original ones, as they are not involved
in any agreement, and expect no transfer payments if winning. Finally,
all externalities in the reduced matrix also stay as the original ones, as no
relevant bidder is to get a transfer payment if another relevant bidder wins.
This idea is formalized in the following lemma, which proof follows directly
from definition 2.2.
Lemma 3.2. Consider a generic zero-externality market. Let s = (C,Bl, d)
be the state of the economy when the auction takes place. For all k, j ∈ B(s)
denote Xkj(s) the payoff to agent Bj if Bk consumes the good in state s.
Then the matrix Xkj(s) of dimension |B(s)| is well defined and is given by:
• If k = j = l, Xkj(s) = pil + dl.
• If k = j 6= l, then Xkj(s) = pik.
• If k 6= j, then Xkj(s) = 0.
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Example 3.3. Consider a generic 0-externality market with 3 potential buy-
ers. Consider the state s = ({B1, B2}, B1, (−x, x)). That is, B1 and B2 form
a cartel, where B1 is its bidder, and if B1 eventually wins the good, he com-
mits to pay x to B2. Then B(s) = {B1, B3}, and X(s) is given by the
following matrix:
1 3
1 pi1 − x 0
3 0 pi3
Finally, the discussed link between agents behavior in the auction and
the agreements they are involved in is used in order to prove the formation
of the grand-cartel in equilibrium in the absence of externalities.
The proof of the concluding proposition of this section is brought in ap-
pendix C. The intuition, however, is quite clear. Due to the absence of
externalities, the agent with the highest valuation, is the efficient one. If the
negotiation status-quo is followed, the efficient agent wins the auction and
consumes the good. By forming the grand-cartel with the efficient agent as
the cartel bidder, the collusion designer can extract the seller’s surplus from
the efficient agent as a transfer payment, since the latter is going to win the
good for the price of . As the efficient agent wins the good in the negotiation
status-quo in the first place, all other agents stay indifferent to the offer to
form the grand-cartel with the efficient agent as the cartel bidder. Hence,
the collusion designer need not compensate any of them, and the seller’s
surplus is his net gain. Any alternative offer to form a smaller cartel, pre-
serves competition between potential buyer in the auction, which raises the
winning price, and in turn decreases the surplus which the collusion designer
can extract.
Proposition 3.4. In a generic market without externalities the set of SPNE
points of the collusion game is not empty. Moreover, full collusion, i.e. the
all-bidder cartel, emerges with probability 1 in all SPNE points of the game.
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4 Formation of small cartels in the presence
of externalities
We establish in this section that the presence of externalities may lead agents
to form small cartels. In order to understand how an agreement to form a
cartel affects the state of the economy we start by an analysis which is similar
to the one in the previous section. We show that in every possible state there
is a bid which is in equilibrium in a first price auction. In appendix D we
prove that the set of SPNE points of the game in the presence of externalities
is not empty. (As stated in the previous section, we consider pure bidding
strategies in the auction stage, hence, the existence of SPNE is to be proved.)
Finally, we demonstrate that there exists a market with externalities where
partial collusion arises in SPNE with positive probability.
Lemma 4.1. Consider a generic market with externalities. Let s = (C,Bl, d)
be the state of the economy when the auction takes place. For all k, j ∈ B(s)
denote Xkj(s) the payoff to agent Bj if Bk consumes the good in state s.
Then Xkj(s) is well defined and is given by:
• If k = j = l, then Xkj(s) = pil + dl.
• If k = j 6= l, then Xkj(s) = pik.
• If k 6= j, then Xkj(s) = αkj.
The proof follows directly from definition 2.2.
The following example shows that the presence of externalities, may lead
to a situation where the collusion designer is strictly better off forming a
cartel smaller than the grand one. The intuition is that externalities may
be so low, that some agents will demand a high compensation from the
collusion designer in order to join the grand cartel. The designer in this case,
is better off leaving those agents outside the cartel he forms, although he is
risking a tougher competition in the auction by doing so. In the proof of the
proposition we will use the following example.
Example 4.2. Consider the following 4-player market with externalities:
pi1 = 8, pi2 = pi3 = pi4 = 1;α1j = −2,∀j 6= 1;α2j = 0,∀j 6= 2;α3j = −8,∀j 6=
3;α4j = −7, ∀j 6= 4.13
13As already stated, partial collusion may emerge in a 3-player market as well as in a
non-symmetric setup. See section 1.1 for further details.
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8 -2 -2 -2
0 1 0 0
-8 -8 1 -8
-7 -7 -7 1
We claim that in this market, B2 can gain more as a collusion designer by
forming a cartel with B1 only, rather than forming the grand cartel. The
following proposition proves this claim formally, however, we would like to
precede the formal discussion with an intuitive one.
If no cartel is formed and all agents go to the auction as non-cooperating
bidders, i.e. negotiation status-quo, we consider an equilibrium bid as a
result of which B2 wins the auction paying the seller p = 8 for the good.
(See corollary A.2, with m = 1.)
Considering the formation of the grand cartel, it is but natural, that
the collusion designer is best off designating the efficient agent, B1, as the
cartel bidder.14 That is as the efficient agent maximizes the utility of the
grand cartel if he consumes the good. However, if B2, the collusion designer,
wishes to do so, he needs to compensate B3 and B4, as the latter gains a lower
externality if indeed the efficient agent, B1, consumes the good, compared to
the negotiation status-quo (e.g., α13 = −2 < 0 = α23).
And indeed, by excluding B3 and B4 from the cartel (and by that avoiding
the compensations they would claim), and forming a small cartel with B1
only, B2 gains a higher utility as detailed in the proof below. Note, that the
latter is true although clearly by forming a small cartel, the price payed for
the good in the auction rises, compared to an auction in which the grand
cartel forms (p = 3 as opposed to p =  respectively). It means that the
collusion designer is better off experiencing a tougher competition in the
auction, than compensating B3 and B4.
Proposition 4.3. There exists a generic market with externalities, and an
SPNE of the game in this market, in which a cartel smaller than the grand
one forms with a positive probability.
Proof. Consider the 4-player market with externalities in example 4.2.15 We
consider the following strategies of the agents:
14Note, however, that there are markets where the collusion designer may prefer to form
the grand cartel with a bidder different than the efficient agent. This may happen, for
example, if the designer demands a high transfer from the efficient agent, so that the
efficient agent gains more if the seller keeps the good.
15There exist  > 0 and δ > 0, both small enough, such that we can change the valuations
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• In the state s0, agents bid b(s0) = (8− 2, 8, 8− , 8− 2). That is an
equilibrium bid of the first price auction in the state s0, according to
corollary A.2 (with m = 1).
• For every state s, such that Bl is a single bidder in s, namely B(s) =
{Bl}, Bl bids  if X(s) ≥ , and 0 otherwise. According to proposition
A.8 this is an equilibrium bid in this state.
• In the state s12 = ({B1, B2}, B1, d12), where d121 = −d122 = −5
1 3 4
1 3 -2 -2
3 -8 1 -8
4 -7 -7 1
we consider the bid b(s12) = (3, 0, 3− , 3− 2), which is in equilibrium
by corollary A.2.
• For every other state s, consider some equilibrium bid b(s), which exists
as established in appendix D (lemma D.1).
• Finally, with respect to the above described function b(s), for every
proposal made by Bi to move to the state s = (C,Bl, d), every Bj ∈
C \ {Bi} accepts the proposal if and only if uj(s, b(s)) ≥ uj(s0, b(s0)).
As proved in appendix D (corollary D.3), there exists an SPNE of the game
which includes these strategies. It is enough to demonstrate that in such an
SPNE, the utility that B2 derives as the collusion designer by proposing a
cartel different than the grand one, is strictly greater than the utility he can
derive by full collusion.
Consider first the initial state s0. As stated above we consider the bid
b(s0) = (8 − 2, 8, 8 − , 8 − 2). As a result of this bid B2 wins the good,
pays p = 8 to the seller and consumes. The utility vector of the agents is
therefore u(s0, b(s0)) = (α21, pi2 − p, α23, α24) = (0,−7, 0, 0).
Consider now the offer to form the grand cartel with the efficient agent
as its representative, namely, to move to the state sGC = (B,B1, d
GC), where
and externalities in the neighborhood of δ, in order to achieve genericity of the market.
Moreover, for small enough  and δ the analysis in the proof holds for the generic market
as well.
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dGC = (−8 + , 4− , 2, 2). If the offer is accepted then X(sGC) = pi1 +dGC1 =
8+(−8+) = . Therefore, B1 bids  and wins the auction. He pays p =  to
the seller, and gets pi1− p+ dGC1 = 8− + (−8 + ) = 0. As u1(s0, b(s0)) = 0,
B1 accepts the offer. In a similar way, if the offer is accepted, and B1 wins the
good and consumes, B3 gains α13 + d
GC
3 = −2 + 2 = 0. As u3(s0, b(s0)) = 0,
B3 accepts the offer. The same holds for B4. To conclude, B2 gains by
proposing the discussed offer a utility of α12 + d
GC1
2 = −2 + 4 −  = 2 − .
Clearly, B2 cannot gain by proposing a higher transfer to any of the agents.
On the other hand, by proposing a lower transfer to either B3 or B4, the offer
will be rejected and the grand cartel will not form. Offering a lower transfer
payment to B1, will lead to a state where B1 bids 0 in the auction, the good
stays in the possession of the seller, and B2 gains 0, which is strictly less than
what he gains by proposing sGC .
The same analysis can be repeated considering other possible bidders on
behalf of the grand cartel, to conclude that by forming the grand cartel B2
can gain at most 2−  with respect to the considered strategy profile.
We now proceed to demonstrate an alternative offer to form a cartel with
B1 only, i.e., partial collusion, which is accepted by B1 according to the
considered strategy profile, and yields B2 a strictly greater utility. Consider
the proposal to move to the state s12 = ({B1, B2}, B1, d12), where d121 =
−d122 = −5. X(s12) is given by:
1 3 4
1 3 -2 -2
3 -8 1 -8
4 -7 -7 1
where, X(s12)11 = pi1 + d
12
1 = 8 + (−5) = 3. We consider the following
equilibrium bid b(s12) = (3, 0, 3− , 3− 2). As a result of which B1 wins the
auction as a single winner, pays p = 3 to the seller, and consumes the good.
He therefore gains, X(s12)11 − p = 3− 3 = 0 which is equal to u1(s0, b(s0)).
Therefore, B1 accepts the offer, and B2 can gain α12 + d
12
2 = 0 + 3 = 3.
Indeed, that is a greater utility than the one that can be achieved by full
collusion, and therefore there is a positive probability that the grand cartel
will not form in the considered SPNE.
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5 Efficiency
In the previous section we demonstrated that partial collusion may arise in
SPNE in the presence of externalities. In this section, we further show that
the cartel bidder in SPNE in the presence of externalities is not necessarily
the cartel’s efficient member. This phenomenon is explained by a trade-off
between the welfare of the cartel on one hand, which is maximized if the
efficient member of the cartel consumes the good, and the price paid for the
good on the other hand, which depends on the externalities that the cartel
bidder exerts on fringe agents, i.e. agents outside the cartel.
Consider a 3-player market in which the only feasible cartel is C =
{B1, B2}, and let B1 be the collusion designer.16 The following example
presents a setup in which B2 is the cartel’s efficient member, and at the same
time introduces a major threat on the fringe agent B3. A-priori in order
to maximize the cartel’s profits, it should be represented in the auction by
B2. Doing so, however, would increase dramatically the price that the cartel
would need to pay in the auction if winning, as the fringe agent would be
bidding aggressively in order to avoid the potential loss he might suffer if B2
indeed wins. The collusion designer in this case is better off if the cartel is
not represented by its efficient member, as the low price the cartel will pay
compensates for the loss of potential welfare.
Example 5.1. Consider the following 3-player market with externalities:
pi1 = pi2 = 2, pi3 = 1, α12 = −1, α23 = −10, α31 = α32 = −2, and all other
externalities are null. Let B1 be the collusion designer in the beginning of
the second stage.
2 -1 0
0 2 -10
-2 -2 1
Consider a proposal to form the cartel C = {B1, B2}. B2 is the efficient
member of this cartel as pi2 + α21 > pi1 + α12. Note that B2 is a great threat
to B3 as α23 = −10. Therefore, B3 would be willing to place a high bid
in order to prevent B2 from winning the auction. Hence, if B1 wishes to
16Caillaud and Jehiel (1998) consider such an example where 2 European firms were
considering a joint venture vis-a-vis a Japanese firm in the 1992 South-Korean high speed
train tender. A joint venture in the context of this example between a European firm and
the Japanese one is less likely to be feasible.
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send B2 to the auction as the cartel bidder, he has to commit to a high
transfer payment to B2, to enable him to overcome B3’s expected high bid.
We demonstrate that B1 can gain more by proposing himself as the cartel
bidder, rather than proposing B2.
Consider first the initial state s0, where agents bid b(s0) = (4−2, 4−, 4).
(This is an equilibrium bid in this state according to corollary A.2.) As a
result of this bid, B3 wins the good, pays p = 4 to the seller, and consumes the
good. The utility vector of the agents is therefore u(s0, b(s0)) = (α31, α32, pi3−
p) = (−2,−2,−3).
Consider now the proposal to move the economy to the state s1 = (C,B1, d
1),
where d11 = −d12 = 1. If B2 accepts the offer then the economy moves to the
state s1. X(s1) is given by:
1 3
1 3 0
3 -2 1
where, X(s1)11 = pi1 + d
1
1 = 2 + 1 = 3. We consider the following equilibrium
bid b(s1) = (1, 0, 1 − ). (This is an equilibrium bid in this state according
to corollary A.2.) As a result of which B1 wins the auction as a single
winner, pays p = 1 to the seller, and consumes the good. Therefore, B2 gains
α12 + d
1
2 = −1 + (−1) = −2 which is equal to what he gains by rejecting the
offer (i.e., u2(s
0, b(s0))). Hence, B2 may accept the offer in SPNE, and let
us consider a strategy profile in which he does. As a result, by proposing to
move to s1, B1 gains X(s
1)11 − p = 3− 1 = 2.
Let us now look at the alternative proposal to move the economy to
the state s2 = (C,B2, d
2), where the cartel C is represented by its efficient
member B2. If B2 accepts the offer then the economy moves to the state s
2,
where X(s2) is given by:
2 3
2 2 + d22 -10
3 -2 1
In order for B2 to win the auction in state s
2 it must hold that X(s2)22 −
X(s2)32 > X(s
2)33 − X(s2)23 (see corollary A.2), namely 2 + d22 − (−2) >
1− (−10), which is equivalent to d22 > 7. We conclude that if B1 proposes B2
as the cartel bidder, he ends up with a negative utility (his transfer payment
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would be negative, and the externality that B2 exerts on B1 is null).
17 Hence,
B1 can profit more by going to the auction himself as the cartel bidder, rather
than sending the cartel’s efficient member.
The following proposition discusses inefficient collusion in the presence of ex-
ternalities in the general case, namely, where any form of collusion is feasible.
The proof appears in appendix E.
Proposition 5.2. There exists a generic market with externalities, and there
exists an SPNE of the collusion game in this market, where with positive
probability, the cartel bidder is not the cartel’s efficient member.
6 Strategic non-participation
Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) presented the idea of strategic non-participation
in auctions. They considered an extended auction game, where in the first
stage all agents decide simultaneously whether they wish to participate or not
in the auction. At the next stage the auction takes place, and only agents who
have decided to participate during the first stage take part in it. At the end
of the auction, the winner consumes the good, gains his valuation and pays
the proper price to the seller. Every other agent, whether he has participated
or not in the auction, gains the corresponding externality according to the
identity of the consumer.
They show that agents may be better off committing not to participate
in the auction, providing the following intuition to explain this phenomenon.
The absence of a specific agent in the auction may remove a potential threat
he imposes on others. As a result, the bidding strategy of the participants
may change, which in turn may lead to a different winner. This alternative
winner may be better off for the non-participating agent, as an alternative
consumer of the good, in terms of the externalities which the alternative
winner imposes.
Our model provides agents with the possibility of non-participating, by
joining a cartel in which they commit to place an irrelevant bid. The fol-
lowing proposition provides a link between the strategic non-participation
presented in Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) and the collusion game. We prove
17The analysis omits the case of a tie between B2 and B3 in the state s2, and the case
where the cartel forms and loses the auction. B1 cannot gain a positive utility in any of
these cases as well.
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that in the collusion game, the collusion designer can gain strictly more than
what he could have achieved by not participating a` la Jehiel and Moldovanu.
The intuition is, that by full collusion where the negotiation status-quo win-
ner is the designated cartel bidder, the collusion designer can have all agents
accepting to join for an  transfer payment. In this way he is capable of
extracting a net transfer approximately equal to the seller’s surplus in nego-
tiation status-quo. This net transfer is large enough to beat any externality,
especially the externality he would have gained if not participating a` la Je-
hiel and Moldovanu. As we wish to compare with non-participation of the
collusion designer only, the following definitions suffice for the proposition
we present.
Consider a generic market with externalities consisting of n potential
buyers, and let Bi be a potential buyer. We say that the bidding vector
bNPi ∈ Rn is an equilibrium bid of the first price auction in the market which
corresponds to the non-participation of Bi, if b
NPi
i = 0, and if omitting the
i’th coordinate of bNPi yields a bidding vector in Rn−1, which is an equilibrium
bid in a first price auction held in the market derived from the original market
by omitting the i’th row and column.18
We denote ui(b
NPi) the utility of the non-participating agent. If Bw is
the winner in a first price auction held in a market which corresponds to the
non-participation of Bi, then ui(b
NPi) = αwi.
Finally, in order to be consistent with their framework of externalities,
we will respect their restriction to non-positive externalities, namely, for all
i 6= j, αijle0.
Proposition 6.1. Consider a generic market with externalities, where all
externalities are non-positive. Let Bi be the collusion designer at the second
stage. Then in every SPNE of a sub-game of the collusion game where Bi is
the collusion designer, he gains strictly more than what he could have gained
by not participating a` la Jehiel and Moldovanu.
Namely, consider an SPNE of the sub-game of the collusion game where
Bi is drawn to be the collusion designer, let s be the state in which the auction
takes place in this SPNE, and let b(s) be the corresponding bidding vector,
then for every bNPi, a bidding vector which is an equilibrium of the first price
18All other agents but Bi participate in the auction as single bidders. Note that a
market derived from a generic market by omitting a row and a column is also generic. It
follows that the bidding vector b = 0 is not an equilibrium of the auction in the derived
market. Moreover, a bidding vector which leads to a tie is not in equilibrium.
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auction in the market which corresponds to the non-participation of Bi, it
holds that:
ui(s, b(s)) > ui(b
NPi)
Proof. Consider an SPNE of the sub-game of the collusion game where Bi
is drawn to be the collusion designer. Denote b(s) the function which maps
every state s to an equilibrium bid of the first price auction in this SPNE.
Finally, let bNPi be an equilibrium bid of the first price auction in the market
which corresponds to the non-participation of Bi. Denote Bw the winner of
the auction in state s0 according to b(s0), and denote Bw′ the winner of the
auction if Bi is not participating, according to b
NPi . Due to genericity there
is no tie in s0, nor in the market which corresponds to the non-participation
of Bi. Moreover, it is readily verified that the no-winner bid, b = 0, is not in
equilibrium. Hence, by non-participating Bi gains αw′i.
Let us consider first the case where Bi is the winner in s
0, namely Bw =
Bi. Consider the state where the grand cartel forms with Bi as the cartel
bidder, namely sGC
i
= (B,Bi, d
GCi), where dGC
i
j = , for all j 6= i, and dGCii =
−(n−1). If all agents accept the offer, then the grand cartel forms, and Bi is
a single bidder. Genericity yields X(sGC
i
) = pii+d
GCi
i = pii−(n−1) > . By
proposition A.8, Bi wins the good in s
GCi for the price of p = . Therefore,
every agents Bj 6= Bi derives a utility of αij + dGCij = αij + . The latter
is strictly greater than his utility if he refuses the offer, αij. As lemma C.7
clearly holds also for a market with externalities, it follows that this offer is
accepted in every SPNE of the considered sub-game. Thus, Bi gains in every
SPNE at least pii + d
GCi
i − p = pii − n, which is strictly greater than αw′i.
Consider now the case Bw 6= Bi. The analysis is similar. Consider the
state sGC
w
= (B,Bw, d
GCw), where dGC
w
j = , for all j 6= i, w, dGCww =
−p(s0) + 2, and dGCii = p(s0) − n. If the offer is rejected, every agent
Bj 6= Bi, Bw gains αwj, whereas Bw gets piw − p(s0). If all agents accept the
offer, then the grand cartel forms, and Bw is a single bidder. We consider 2
different cases according to Bw’s bid in SPNE at the state s
GCw .
If Bw bids 0 in SPNE at the state s
GCw , then the good stays in the pos-
session of the seller and all agents gain a 0 utility. According to proposition
A.8, bidding 0 in SPNE yields  ≥ piw + dGCww = piw − p(s0) + 2, otherwise,
Bw would profitably win the good for a minimal price of p = . It therefore
holds that 0 > piw−p(s0), hence, from lemma C.7, Bw accepts the considered
offer in every such SPNE of the game. As all externalities are negative, for
all j 6= i, w, 0 < αwj, and therefore, all other agents accept the considered
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offer as well in every such SPNE of the game. We conclude that Bi can gain
in such SPNE 0, which is strictly greater than αw′i.
Alternatively, being the only bidder in the auction, Bw bids  in the
state sGC
w
, and wins the good for the price of p = . Hence, every agents
Bj 6= Bi, Bw derives a utility of αwj + dGCwj = αwj + , and Bw derives
piw−p+dGCww = piw−p(s0) + . As all agents gain strictly more by accepting
this offer than by rejecting it, it follows from lemma C.7, that this offer is
accepted in every SPNE of the game, where Bw bids  in s
GCw . Thus, Bi
gains in every such SPNE at least αwi+d
GCw
i = αwi+p(s
0)−n. By corollary
A.2, it holds that p(s0) ≥ max
j 6=w
(pij−αwj). Therefore, Bi’s utility in every such
SPNE is at least αwi + max
j 6=w
(pij − αwj)− n ≥ αwi + pii − αwi − n = pii − n,
which is strictly greater than αw′i.
7 Model extension - Contingent transfers on
a winner outside the cartel
In this section we consider a possible extension to the collusion game, which
corresponds to the following motivation. Consider a market where the col-
lusion designer is interested in the winning of a specific agent, a ”preferred
consumer”, due to a high externality which this ”preferred consumer” exerts
on the collusion designer, for example. However, forming a cartel repre-
sented by this ”preferred consumer”, as the collusion game suggests, may
not be feasible, as the ”preferred consumer” may claim a high transfer. In
such a market, the collusion designer might profit from the possibility to
form a cartel with other agents who will also enjoy high externalities if this
”preferred consumer” wins the auction. The designer may then extract some
transfer payments from these agents, which are contingent on the winning of
the ”preferred consumer” who is not part of the formed cartel.
With respect to definition 2.2, a state is now extended to be the tuple
(C,Bl, Bw, d). The interpretation is that, as before, the cartel C is repre-
sented in the auction by its member Bl, who is the only member who may
make a positive bid in the auction. However, the transfer payments d are
made among the members of the cartel C, if and only if Bw wins the auc-
tion. Restricting to Bw = Bl yields the collusion game, discussed so far in
this paper.
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When the extended collusion game reaches a state s, where Bl 6= Bw,
then in the matrix of the updated externalities X(s), it is the term X(s)wl
which is updated, to take the value X(s)wl = αwl + dl (See lemma 4.1).
Note, that in a market without externalities, as agents have no reason to
prefer one consumer over the other, there is no motivation to form a cartel
with contingent transfers on a winner outside the cartel. The analysis in
this case is analogous to the one presented in the collusion game, and indeed
full collusion arises in SPNE (See proposition 3.4). We shall not go further
to formalize the extended collusion game, but demonstrate its motivation
instead.
Example 7.1. Consider the following 4-player market with externalities:
pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = pi4 = 1, α12 = α13 = α14 = −1, α21 = −5, α34 = −4, α41 =
α42 = α43 = −6, and all other externalities are null.
6 -1 -1 -1
0 1 0 0
5 0 1 -5
-1 -6 -6 1
Consider B2 as the collusion designer. B2 can gain more in the extended
collusion game by forming a cartel with B1, where the transfer are contingent
on the winning of the agent they both prefer as a consumer, B3. In status-
quo, we consider a bid, as a result of which B2 wins the good for the price
of p = 6 (See corollary A.2). Hence, the utilities of the agents in negotiation
status-quo are u = (0,−5, 0, 0).
Following an analysis similar to the one presented in proposition 5.2 leads
to the conclusion that in all SPNE points of the collusion game, B2 cannot
gain more than 3 (e.g., forming the grand cartel with the efficient agent, B1,
as the cartel bidder).
Consider now the following alternative proposal that B2 may make in the
extended collusion game. B2 forms a cartel with B1, where B2 is the cartel
bidder, and B1 commits to pay B2 a transfer of d2 = 5 if B3, their preferred
consumer, wins the auction. Note that B1 is ready to pay such a transfer due
to ”free-riding” if B3 indeed wins. The externality which the latter exerts
on B1 is higher compared to the externality which is exerted on B1 in the
negotiation status-quo (i.e., α31 = 5 > 0 = α21).
Such an agreement leads to a state s, corresponding to the following
matrix of externalities X(s):
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2 3 4
2 1 0 0
3 5 1 -5
4 -6 -6 1
where X(s)32 = α32 + d2 = 0 + 5 = 5, as B2 gets a transfer payment from
B1 if indeed B3 wins the auction and consumes the good. We consider a
bid in this state, which results in the winning of B3 for the price of p = 6
(See corollary A.2). Therefore, B1 makes the transfer agreed upon to B2,
who ends up, after taking into account the corresponding externality which
is exerted on him, with a utility of α32 + d2 = 0 + 5 = 5. This is more than
he can gain in the collusion game as explained before.
As a concluding remark for this section we wish to note that the model
might be further on extended, to consider agreements where agents commit to
different transfer payments for different possible consumers. As mentioned
earlier in this section, since in the absence of externalities agents have no
reason to prefer one consumer over the other, one concludes that in such
an extended model the behavior of agents in a market without externalities
is similar to their behavior in the collusion game. Namely, full collusion
will always appear in equilibrium (See proposition 3.4). Moreover, as the
collusion game is a restricted case of such an extension, and if the grand
cartel forms there is only one possible consumer (the cartel bidder), which
narrows down the extended model to the collusion game again, one concludes
that small cartels may form in equilibrium in the presence of externalities in
an extended model as well.
8 Conclusion
We considered a first price auction in which the winner exerts direct external
effects on losing bidders. We further specified a negotiation protocol accord-
ing to which agents may form a bidding ring prior to the auction, where all
bidders but the cartel representative commit to place an irrelevant bid in the
auction.
We showed that in the absence of externalities bidders will form the all-
inclusive cartel, which in turn eliminates competition in the auction, and
allows winning the good for a minimal price. In the presence of external
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effects inefficiencies may arise. The collusion designer may find it profitable
to form a small cartel excluding demanding bidders while risking tougher
competition in the auction. Furthermore, we showed that the formed cartel
may be better off designating an inefficient representative if the efficient cartel
member constitutes a major threat on fringe bidders, as such a threat may
lead to aggressive bids and a high winning price.
Finally, a comparison was made between strategic non-participation (Je-
hiel and Moldovanu (1996)) and strategic collusion, finding that the collusion
designer is strictly better off forming an appropriate bidding ring than not
participating in the auction at all.
A Appendix: First price auction equilibrium
in the presence of externalities
The collusion game we study in this work has, generally speaking, two phases.
It starts with a negotiation phase, in which agents are allowed to form a
cartel, given some transfer payments among them. In the second phase,
a first price auction takes place. The participating bidders are all players
who are not part of the cartel, and the cartel bidder only. All members of
the cartel other than its representative, are committed to bid 0. As only
positive bids may win, a 0-bid in the auction is practically equivalent to
non-participating.
Every SPNE point of the collusion game includes a bidding strategy for
every possible state. Namely, a bidding strategy which corresponds to a
market with externalities in which a certain cartel was formed with a certain
representative, and a commitment to transfer payments (See definition 2.2).
This bidding strategy is, in particular, a set of equilibrium points of the
first price auction which takes place in the different states. The following
discussion characterizes the pure equilibrium bids in a first price auction,
which takes place in a market with externalities, not necessarily generic (Due
to transfer payments, see example 3.3). The grand cartel may form, and in
this case only one bidder actively participates in the auction. Hence, we will
discuss also the case of a first price auction with a single bidder. We remind
the reader that bids in the auction are discrete, and correspond to a given
smallest money unit, denoted .
We start the analysis with the case of a single winner. In a first price
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auction, the winner bids in equilibrium just a bit above the second highest
bid, formally, . Therefore, if the winner lowers his bid a bit, he is in tie with
the second highest bidders. Thus, we give special attention to the number of
second highest bids, in the equilibrium analysis.
We draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the following necessary
and sufficient condition is met in a generic market. Hence, in a generic
market there is always an equilibrium of the first price auction. As corollary
A.7 shows, this is not necessarily the case in a non-generic market.
Proposition A.1. Let n ≥ 3, and m < n − 1. The following condition
is necessary and sufficient for having an equilibrium bid b = (b1, b2, ..., bn)
where Bi wins the auction as a single winner, and Bk1 , Bk2 , . . . , Bkm are the
second highest bidders. Namely, bi > bk1 = bk2 = ... = bkm > bj for all
j 6= i, k1, k2, .., km:
∀j 6= i pii − 1
m
− 1
m
m∑
l=1
αkli ≥ max{pij − αij, 2}19
Proof. Assume that such an equilibrium point exists. We will demonstrate
that the condition holds. Note, that as b is an equilibrium bid, it holds that
bkl = bi − , for all 1 ≤ l ≤ m. In order for Bi to profit from winning the
auction it must hold that 1
m+1
(pii− (bi− )) + 1m+1
m∑
l=1
αkli ≤ pii− bi, which is
equivalent to bi ≤ pii− 1m
m∑
l=1
αkli− 1m. In words, Bi is better off bidding bi at
least as bidding bkl = bi−. The condition we bring here regarding a possible
tie with Bkl is stronger than the one corresponding to a situation where Bi
bids below bkl . In addition, it is necessary that any agent Bj, where j 6= i,
cannot profit from bidding bi which means that
1
2
(pij−bi)+ 12αij ≤ αij, which
is equivalent to bi ≥ pij−αij. Again, it is a stronger condition than saying that
Bj cannot profit from over-bidding Bi’s bid. Finally, let j 6= i, k1, k2, ..., km.
As bi > bk1 = bk2 = ... = bkm > bj ≥ 0 it follows that bi ≥ 2. Combining the
three conditions on bi yields, ∀j 6= i, pii− 1m− 1m
m∑
l=1
αkli ≥ max{pij−αij, 2},
as required.
19If n = 2 or m = n − 1, the necessary and sufficient condition is, ∀j 6= i pii − 1m −
1
m
m∑
l=1
αkli ≥ max{pij − αij , }.
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Assume now that the condition holds for some Bi, Bk1 , Bk2 ...Bkm , all dif-
ferent. Then there exists p such that ∀j 6= i, pii − 1m − 1m
m∑
l=1
αkli ≥ p ≥
max{pij − αij, 2}, and p is a valid bid. Consider the following bidding vec-
tor: bi = p, bk1 = bk2 = ... = bkm = p − , and for all j 6= i, k1, k2, ..., km,
bj = p − 2. Then Bi wins the good as a single winner, pays p to the seller
and gains ui = pii − p. Every other agent Bj 6= Bi gains uj = αij. Clearly,
Bi cannot gain more by raising his bid. If Bi lowers his bid to p− , he wins
with probability 1
m+1
and gains 1
m+1
(pii − (p− )) + 1m+1
m∑
l=1
αkli. It is readily
verified that this utility is at most pii − p. If he lowers his bid further below
p − , he gains 1
m
m∑
l=1
αkli which is strictly less than pii − p. For any j 6= i, it
is clear that Bj cannot gain more by any bid lower than bi = p. By bidding
p, Bj gains
1
2
(pij − p) + 12αij. It is readily verified that due to the condition
this term is lower than uj = αij. The same holds for overbidding Bi.
Corollary A.2. Let n ≥ 3, m < n − 1, and let b = (b1, b2, ..., bn) be a
bidding vector where Bi makes the single highest bid and Bk1 , Bk2 , . . . , Bkm
make the second highest bid. Namely, bi > bk1 = bk2 = ... = bkm > bj for all
j 6= i, k1, k2, .., km. Then b is an equilibrium point of the first price auction if
and only if:
∀j 6= i pii − 1
m
− 1
m
m∑
l=1
αkli ≥ bi ≥ max{pij − αij, 2}20
∀1 ≤ l ≤ m bkl = bi − 
The following analysis, characterizes equilibrium bids in which there is a
tie between several bidders. The case were all bidders are in tie is handled
separately.
Proposition A.3. Let 2 ≤ m < n. The following are necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for having an equilibrium bid b = (b1, b2, ..., bn) where there
20If n = 2 or m = n− 1, the necessary and sufficient conditions are, ∀j 6= i pii − 1m−
1
m
m∑
l=1
αkli ≥ bi ≥ max{pij − αij , }, and ∀1 ≤ l ≤ m bkl = bi − .
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are m winners, denoted Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bim:
∀1 ≤ k 6= l ≤ m |(piik−
1
m− 1
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik)−(piil−
1
m− 1
m∑
j=1,j 6=l
αijil)| ≤
m
m− 1
∀1 ≤ k ≤ m,∀m < q ≤ n max{, piiq−
1
m
m∑
j=1
αijiq} ≤ piik−
1
m− 1
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik
Proof. Let b be a bid which leads to m winners, denoted Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , Bim ,
and denote p the winning bid in b. Namely, p = bi1 = bi2 = ... = bim > bj for
all j 6= i1, i2, ..., im. Note that as p is a winning bid it holds that p ≥ . Then
the utilities of the agents are:
uik =

1
m
[(piik − p) +
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik ] if 1 ≤ k ≤ m
1
m
m∑
j=1
αijik if m < k ≤ n
Assume that b is in equilibrium. We demonstrate that the conditions hold.
Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. As b is in equilibrium, it holds that Bik cannot profit from
neither overbidding nor underbidding p. Namely, piik−(p+) ≤ 1m [(piik−p)+
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik ] and
1
m−1
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik ≤ 1m [(piik − p) +
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik ] respectively. It
follows that piik − mm−1− 1m−1
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik ≤ p ≤ piik − 1m−1
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik , which
yields the first condition in the statement. Moreover, for all m < q ≤ n it
holds that Biq cannot profit from bidding p as well. Formally,
1
m+1
[(piiq−p)+
m∑
j=1
αijiq ] ≤ 1m
m∑
j=1
αijiq , which is equivalent to p ≥ piiq − 1m
m∑
j=1
αijiq . Together
with the former conditions on p we get the second condition in the statement.
Note, that the latter is stronger than demanding that Biq cannot profit from
overbidding p.
We now demonstrate that the conditions are sufficient. It follows from
the conditions that there exists p ≥  such that,
∀1 ≤ k 6= l ≤ m p ≤ piik −
1
m− 1
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik ≤ p+
m
m− 1
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∀m < q ≤ n piiq −
1
m
m∑
j=1
αijiq ≤ p
Consider the following bid, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m bik = p, and for all m < q ≤ n
biq = p − . Following the same analysis as above, it is readily verified that
b is in equilibrium.
Corollary A.4. Let 2 ≤ m < n, and let b = (b1, b2, ..., bn) be a bidding vector
where Bi1 , Bi2 , ..., Bim make the highest bid, denoted p. Namely, p = bi1 =
bi2 = ... = bim > bj for all j 6= i1, i2, ..., im. Then b is an equilibrium point of
the first price auction if and only if:
∀1 ≤ k ≤ m piik−
m
m− 1−
1
m− 1
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik ≤ p ≤ piik−
1
m− 1
m∑
j=1,j 6=k
αijik
∀m < q ≤ n p ≥ max{, piiq −
1
m
m∑
j=1
αijiq}
In the special case where all agents are winners, namely m = n, we
get the following characterization in a similar way.
Proposition A.5. The following are necessary and sufficient conditions for
having an equilibrium bid b = (b1, b2, ..., bn) where all buyers are winners.
Namely, b1 = b2 = ... = bn ≥ :
∀1 ≤ k 6= l ≤ n |(pik − 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=k
αjk)− (pil − 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=l
αjl)| ≤ n
n− 1
∀1 ≤ k ≤ n pik − 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=k
αjk ≥ 
Corollary A.6. Let b = (b1, b2, ..., bn) be a bidding vector where all buyers
make the same bid, denoted p. Then b is an equilibrium of the first price
auction if and only if there exists p ≥  such that:
∀1 ≤ k ≤ n pik − n
n− 1−
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=k
αjk ≤ p ≤ pik − 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=k
αjk
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As a conclusion of the characterization that we have presented so far in
this appendix, we get the following corollary, which demonstrates a non-
generic market with externalities, in which none of the sufficient conditions
is satisfied, namely, there is no equilibrium bid in the first price auction
held in this market. Nevertheless, in the analysis of the collusion game, we
prove that although many states of the economy correspond to non-generic
markets, in every state of the collusion game, there exists an equilibrium bid
in pure strategies in the first price auction held in the market corresponding
to the state in question.
Corollary A.7. In the following non-generic market there is no bid which
is in equilibrium in the first price auction for a small enough : pi1 = 1, pi2 =
2, pi3 = 3, α13 = −1, α21 = −3, α32 = −2, and all other externalities are null.
1 0 -1
-3 2 0
0 -2 3
In order to complete the analysis, and as we consider a negotiation process
before the auction during which a cartel may form , we need to consider the
special case in which the grand cartel forms in the market, which yields a
single bidder in the auction.
Proposition A.8. Consider a market with externalities. If a single agent,
Bl, goes to the auction in X(s) = X(s)ll
21 then:
• If X(s)ll >  then  is the only equilibrium bid for Bl.
• If X(s)ll <  then 0 is the only equilibrium bid for Bl.
• If X(s)ll =  then 0 and  are the only equilibrium bids for Bl.
Proof. If X(s)ll >  then by bidding , Bl wins the auction consumes the
good and gets X(s)ll − . Clearly, he cannot gain more by raising his bid.
By lowering his bid to 0, the good stays in the possession of the seller, and
Bl gets 0 < X(s)ll − .
If X(s)ll <  then by bidding 0, the good stays in the possession of the
seller, and Bl gets 0. By raising his bid to , he wins the auction and gains
X(s)ll −  < 0.
21See, lemma 4.1.
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Finally, if X(s)ll =  by bidding  he wins and gains X(s)ll − , which is
the same as what he gains if he bids 0. Clearly, by raising the bid he cannot
gain more.
B Appendix: Weakly dominated strategies
in first price auction
The following lemma characterizes the undominated bidding strategy in a
first price auction which takes place in a generic market in the presence of
externalities. The non-generic case follows a similar analysis.
Lemma B.1. Consider a generic market with externalities. Denote βi =
pii −minαji − . Then any bid bi > βi is weakly dominated by βi, the bid 0
is dominated by the bid , and every positive bid 0 < bi ≤ βi is undominated.
Proof. Note that due to genericity βi > 0. Let b−i be a bid of all players
but Bi, and let bi > βi, or equivalently, bi ≥ βi + . If bi is not the highest
bid in b, then player Bi achieves the same utility by bidding bi as by bidding
βi. Assume that bi is the highest bid. If Bi is a single winner in b then he
gains a utility of ui = pii − bi ≤ pii − (βi + ) = minαji, which means that by
lowering his bid to βi he can only do better. If Bi is one among m winners,
denoted {Bi, Bj1 , Bj2 , . . . , Bjm−1}, then his utility is
ui =
1
m
(pii − bi) + 1
m
m−1∑
k=1
αjki ≤
1
m
(pii − (βi + )) + 1
m
m−1∑
k=1
αjki =
1
m
(minαji) +
1
m
m−1∑
k=1
αjki ≤
1
m− 1
m−1∑
k=1
αjki
the latter being what Bi gains by lowering his bid to βi.
Consider now a zero bid made by Bi. If all other agents make a zero bid
as well, Bi gains 0. By bidding  instead he gains pii − 0, which is positive
due to genericity. If alternatively the highest bid is positive, then by bidding
, Bi cannot gain less.
Let 0 < bi ≤ βi, and denote k = arg minαji. Consider the following bid
of all the players but Bi. Bk bids bk = bi− , and every Bj such that j 6= i, k
bids 0. Bi is a single winner and he derives a utility of pii− bi. It is clear that
33
by raising his bid he gains strictly less. If bi > , then by lowering his bid he
gains strictly less as pii − bi > αki, and bk = bi −  > 0. Alternatively, bi = ,
and his utility is pii −  which is positive and therefore strictly greater than
the utility he gets if lowering his bid to 0.
The following example demonstrates a market with externalities in which
every equilibrium bid involves a weakly dominated strategy of at least one
of the agents.
Example B.2. Consider a 5-player market with externalities where: pi1 =
5, pi2 = 1, pi3 = 6, pi4 = 7, pi5 = 8, α21 = −5, α35 = −1, α43 = −3, α54 = −2,
and all other externalities are null.
5 0 0 0 0
-5 1 0 0 0
0 0 6 0 -1
0 0 -3 7 0
0 0 0 -2 8
For a small enough , the only equilibrium bid is where B1 is a single winner,
bidding at least 8, and B2 makes the second highest bid (See appendix A).
Hence, B2 bids at least 8 − , which is a weakly dominated strategy for
him.
C Appendix: Proof of full collusion in the
absence of externalities
Throughout this appendix, we will assume, thus WLOG, that in a generic
market without externalities, pi1 > pi2 > ... > pin. Note, that due to genericity
it holds in particular that for all 1 ≤ i < n, pii − pii+1 > (n + 2), as well as
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, pii > (n+ 2).
We learn from Lemma 3.2, that indeed for any state s, X(s) is a market
without externalities, however, it is not necessarily generic (e.g., consider
x = pi1 − pi3 in example 3.3). Nevertheless, as at most one valuation has
changed, the updated matrix is generic, except maybe for a single valuation.
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We give special attention to the question of genericity in the update matrix,
as non-genericity may lead to potential ties in the auction which follows.22
Lemma C.1. Consider a generic 0-externality market, and let s = (C,Bl, d)
be a state. If dim(X(s)) ≥ 2, denote the 2 highest valuations in X(s),
i1 = arg maxX(s)jj, and i2 = arg max
j 6=i1
X(s)jj. Then one of the followings
holds:
• X(s) is of dimension one.
• dim(X(s)) ≥ 2, and X(s)i1i1 −X(s)i2i2 > 2.
• dim(X(s)) ≥ 2, X(s)i1i1 −X(s)i2i2 ≤ 2, and either i1 = l or i2 = l.
Proof. If the grand cartel forms in s, namely C = B, then by lemma 3.2
X(s) = X(s)ll = pil + dl, and the first case in the statement holds. Assume
then that C & B. By lemma 3.2 for every k ∈ B(s) \ {Bl}, it holds that
X(s)kk = pik. As the original market is generic, if i1, i2 6= l then the second
case in the statement holds. Otherwise, either i1 = l or i2 = l and one of
either the second or the third case in the statement holds.
In order to analyze the SPNE points of the collusion game in the absence
of externalities, we now move on to discuss agents’ equilibrium behavior
in the auction given a state s. We distinguish between different scenarios,
according to the different possible market types in which the auction takes
place, as characterized by lemma C.1. The proofs follow from the analysis of
equilibrium bids in a first price auction in a market with externalities which
appears in appendix A, and are therefore omitted.
Lemma C.2. Consider a generic zero externality market, and let s = (B,Bl, d)
be a state where the grand cartel forms. If X(s)ll >  then bidding  is the
only equilibrium strategy of the single bidder Bl in a first price auction in
this market. If X(s)ll <  then bidding 0 is the only equilibrium strategy in
a first price auction in this market. If X(s)ll =  then bidding either  or 0
are the only equilibrium strategies in a first price auction in this market.
22In a non-generic market with externalities, there is not necessarily an equilibrium
bid in a first price auction (see, corollary A.7 in appendix A). This is not the case in a
non-generic market without externalities, where there is always an equilibrium bid in the
auction.
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Lemma C.3. Consider a generic zero-externality market, and let s be a
state. Assume that there are at least 2 potential buyers in s, namely |B(s)| ≥
2. Denote the 2 highest valuations in X(s), i1 = arg maxX(s)jj, and i2 =
arg max
j 6=i1
X(s)jj. If X(s)i1i1 −X(s)i2i2 > 2 then a bidding vector b in a first
price auction held in this state, is in equilibrium if and only if Bi1 makes
the single highest bid, namely, bi1 > bj for all j 6= i1. In addition, the price
p = bi1 that the winner pays for the good, is in the interval X(s)i1i1 > p ≥
max{,X(s)i2i2}.
Lemma C.4. Consider a generic zero-externality market, and let s be a
state. Assume that there are at least 2 potential buyers in s, namely |B(s)| ≥
2. Denote the 2 highest valuations in X(s), i1 = arg maxX(s)jj, and i2 =
arg max
j 6=i1
X(s)jj. Assume that X(s)i1i1 −X(s)i2i2 ≤ 2 and let b be a bidding
vector of a first price auction in this market.
• If X(s)i1i1 = X(s)i2i2 then b is in equilibrium if and only if both Bi1
and Bi2 make the highest bid p. In addition, the price they pay for the
good is in the interval X(s)i1i1 − 2 ≤ p ≤ X(s)i1i1.
• If X(s)i1i1 > X(s)i2i2 then b is in equilibrium if and only if either
Bi1i1 makes the single highest bid p where X(s)i2i2 ≤ p < X(s)i1i1, or
both Bi1i1 and Bi2i2 make the highest bid p where X(s)i1i1 − 2 ≤ p ≤
X(s)i2i2.
As a corollary of lemma C.1, lemma C.2, lemma C.3, and lemma C.4
we conclude, that in every state there exists an equilibrium bid of the first
price auction if held in this state. This is a step in order to establish the
existence of an SPNE point of the collusion game without externalities. Note,
however, that, as remarked before, one may conclude the existence of an
equilibrium bid in every state of the collusion game without externalities,
from the analysis in appendix A only. Nevertheless, lemma C.1, lemma C.2,
lemma C.3, and lemma C.4 are necessary to the proof of proposition 3.4.
Corollary C.5. Consider a generic zero-externality market. There exists a
function, denoted b(s), which maps every state s to an equilibrium bid of the
first price auction in that state.
The following corollary follows from lemma C.3 and lemma C.4, and will
be useful in the proof of proposition 3.4, later in this appendix.
36
Corollary C.6. Consider a generic zero-externality market, and let s =
(C,Bl, d), C & B. If the representative of the cartel, Bl, wins the auction in
s as a single winner or in a tie, then the price p(s) that he pays to the seller
satisfies p(s) > n.
Proof. Using the notations of lemma C.3 and lemma C.4, if Bl is a single
winner, then X(s)ll > X(s)i2i2 > n, where the last inequality holds due
to genericity. Again from lemma C.3 and lemma C.4 we learn that p(s) ≥
X(s)i2i2 , which yields p(s) > n.
IfBl wins in a tie, then from lemma C.4, p ≥ X(s)i1i1−2 ≥ max{X(s)i1i1 , X(s)i2i2}−
2 > (n+ 2)− 2 = n.
The next step in the proof of the existence of an SPNE of the collusion
game without externalities, is to study which offers agents accept and reject
in SPNE. As denoted in corollary C.5, b(s) is an arbitrary mapping of states
to equilibrium bids of the first price auction in these states. In addition,
given b(s), we denote p(s) the corresponding price that the winner pays
to the auctioneer, namely, p(s) = max bi(s). The following lemma follows
directly from the definition of SPNE.
Lemma C.7. Consider a generic market without externalities, and let b(s)
be an arbitrary selection of equilibrium bid of the first price auction for every
state s. Let s(C,Bl, d) 6= s0 be a proposal made by Bi at the second stage
of the game. Denote ur = u(s0, b(s0)) the vector of utilities if the consid-
ered proposal is rejected, and ua(s) = u(s, b(s)) the vector of utilities if it is
accepted. Then for all j ∈ C \ {Bi}:
• If uaj (s) > urj then Bj accepts the offer in every SPNE of the game.
• If uaj (s) < urj then Bj rejects the offer in every SPNE of the game.
proof of proposition 3.4. Let b(s) be an equilibrium point function of the
first price auction. We demonstrate that for every collusion designer who is
selected in the first stage, there exists a proposal to form the grand cartel,
which strictly maximizes his utility, and is accepted by all agents. It follows
that the grand cartel forms with probability one in every SPNE of the game,
as claimed.
If the collusion designer makes an offer that gets rejected, then the econ-
omy stays in state s0. Namely, all agents go to the auction as single non-
cooperating bidders. It follows from lemma C.3 that in s0, B1 wins the good
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for a price of pi2 ≤ p(s0) < pi1. Hence, with respect to the previous notations,
urj =
{
pi1 − p(s0) if j = 1
0 if j ≥ 2
We start with the case where B1, the agent with the highest valuation, is
the collusion designer in the beginning of the second stage. Consider the
proposal to form the grand cartel represented in the auction by B1, with 
transfer payments to all agents. Namely, B1 proposes to move to the state
sGC
1
= (B,B1, d
GC1), where dGC
1
1 = −(n − 1), and for all j 6= 1, dGC1j = .
It follows from genericity and lemma C.2 that in sGC
1
B1 wins the good for
a price of . As all transfer payments in sGC
1
are ,
uaj (s
GC1) =
{
pi1 − n if j = 1
 if j ≥ 2
Then from lemma C.7 B1’s proposal to move to the state s
GC1 is unanimously
accepted, and B1 gains pi1 − n. We need to show that for any alternative
proposal B1 makes, namely to move to the state s = (C,Bl, d) where C & B,
B1 gains strictly less than pi1 − n. If the alternative offer is rejected by at
least one agent, then B1 gains u
r
1 = pi1 − p(s0) ≤ pi1 − pi2 < pi1 − n due to
genericity. If the alternative offer is accepted by all agents, then from lemma
C.7, for all Bj ∈ C \ {B1}, uaj (s) ≥ urj . We consider 2 different cases.
First, consider the case where the proposed representative is B1 himself,
namely, Bl = B1. Then for all Bj ∈ C \ {B1}, dj = uaj (s) ≥ urj = 0. As
transfers are balanced in C it follows that d1 ≤ 0. By corollary C.6, the
price that B1 pays in s if he wins the good, as a single or co-winner, satisfies
p(s) > n. Therefore, if B1 wins the good as a single winner in s he gains
pi1 + d1 − p(s) ≤ pi1 − p(s) < pi1 − n. If B1 wins the good with a second
winner in s he gains 1
2
(pi1 +d1−p(s)) which is again strictly less than pi1−n.
Finally, if B1 loses in s he gets 0 < pi1 − n due to genericity.
Consider now the case where Bl 6= B1. As before, for all Bj ∈ C \ {B1},
uaj (s) ≥ urj , since we assume that the offer is accepted. Therefore, for all
Bj ∈ C \{B1, Bl}, dj = uaj (s) ≥ urj = 0. If Bl wins in s he gains pil+dl−p(s),
whereas in the case of a tie in s with another agent he gains 1
2
(pil +dl−p(s)).
If he loses in s he gains 0. If Bl loses in s then B1 gains 0 < pi1−n. If Bl wins
in s, then 0 = url ≤ ual (s) ≤ pil + dl, as p(s) > 0. Therefore, −dl ≤ pil, which
yields d1 ≤ pil. Thus, if Bl is a single winner in s, B1 gains d1 ≤ pil < pi1−n
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due to genericity. In a similar way, in case of a tie in s, B1 gains strictly
less than pi1 − n. We conclude that if B1 is drawn in the first stage to be
the collusion designer, he can achieve pi1 − n by forming the grand cartel,
and can only gain strictly less by considering any alternative proposal to
form a cartel which is not the grand one. Yet, however, as a function of the
strategies of the others, if the offer to form the grand cartel with B1 as its
representative, is accepted by some Bj 6= B1 for a 0-transfer payment, then
B1 would indeed offer them a 0-transfer payment, in order to maximize his
utility. Clearly, by offering these lower transfer, B1 can only gain more than
pi1 − n.23
We repeat the analysis for the case where at the first stage some Bi 6= B1
is drawn to be the collusion designer. Consider the proposal to form the grand
cartel represented in the auction by B1, with a transfer of −p(s0) + 2 to B1,
and  transfer payments to all other agents. Namely, sGC
i
= (B,B1, d
GCi)
where,
dGC
i
j =

 if j 6= 1, i
−p(s0) + 2 if j = 1
p(s0)− n if j = i
Hence, X(sGC
i
)11 = pi1 − p(s0) + 2 ≥ pi1 − pi2 + 2. Therefore, genericity
yields X(sGC
i
)11 > . By lemma C.2 we conclude that in s
GCi B1 wins the
good for a price of . Therefore,
uaj (s
GCi) =

dj if j 6= 1, i
pi1 − + d1 if j = 1
di if j = i
=

 if j 6= 1, i
pi1 − p(s0) +  if j = 1
p(s0)− n if j = i
Therefore, Bi’s proposal s
GCi is unanimously accepted, and Bi gains p(s
0)−
n. We need to prove that for any alternative proposal s = (C,Bl, d), C & B,
that Bi may make, he gains strictly less than p(s
0)−n. If Bi proposes to stay
in s0, or if the alternative offer is rejected then Bi gains u
r
i = 0 < p(s
0)−n.
It suffices to assume then that the alternative offer is accepted. From lemma
C.7, it holds in this case that for all Bj ∈ C \ {Bi}, uaj (s) ≥ urj . We consider
2 different cases.
23If B1 is the collusion designer then in the different equilibrium points of the game, he
gains a utility of pi1 − (k + 1), where 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 is the number of agents who reject
forming the grand cartel with B1 as its representative for a 0-transfer payment, in the
equilibrium in question.
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First, consider the case where the proposed representative is B1, namely,
Bl = B1. Then for all Bj ∈ C \ {B1, Bi}, dj = uaj (s) ≥ urj = 0. Let
us look at the 3 possible outcomes of the auction in s. If B1 loses then
Bi gains 0 < p(s
0) − n. If B1 wins the auction as a single winner, then
ua1(s) = pi1 − p(s) + d1. As the offer is accepted, it holds that pi1 − p(s0) =
ur1 ≤ ua1(s) = pi1 − p(s) + d1, and therefore, d1 ≥ p(s) − p(s0). As all
other transfer payments are non-negative we conclude that di ≤ p(s0)−p(s).
So Bi gains in this case di ≤ p(s0) − p(s) < p(s0) − n, where the last
inequality follows from corollary C.6. Finally, if B1 wins the auction in
s in a tie with another agent then ua1(s) =
1
2
(pi1 − p(s) + d1), which now
yields d1 ≥ p(s) − 2p(s0) + pi1. In such a case Bi gains 12di ≤ −12d1 ≤−1
2
(p(s) − 2p(s0) + pi1) = p(s0) − 12pi1 − 12p(s) < p(so) − n, where the last
inequality follows from genericity, and from corollary C.6.
Consider now the case where Bl 6= B1. First, assume that Bl = Bi. It
holds that for all Bj ∈ C \ {B1, Bi}, dj = uaj (s) ≥ urj = 0. If Bi loses
the auction in s then he gets 0 < p(s0) − n. It is therefore sufficient to
assume that, either Bi wins in s as a single winner, or Bi wins in a tie with
another agent. If B1 /∈ C, then 1 = arg max
j 6=l
X(s)jj. By lemma C.3 and
lemma C.4, it must hold that pii + di = X(s)ii ≥ X(s)11 − 2 = pi1 − 2. It
yields di ≥ (pi1−pii)− 2 > 0. This stands in a contradiction to the fact that
transfers to all agents but Bi are non-negative. It thus suffices to consider the
case B1 ∈ C. We distinguish between two possible outcomes in the auction in
s according to the bid b(s). If Bi wins in s as a single winner, then as i 6= 1 it
holds that ua1(s) = d1. Furthermore, as u
r
1 = pi1−p(s0), and the offer to move
to state s is accepted in the considered case, we conclude that d1 ≥ pi1−p(s0).
We conclude that Bi gains di ≤ −d1 ≤ −(pi1−p(s0)) < p(s0)−n. It therefore
holds that Bi’s utility in this case is strictly less than p(s
0)−n. Finally, the
analysis in the case where Bi wins in a tie in s is similar.
Finally, assume that Bl 6= Bi. As before, it holds that for all Bj ∈
C \ {B1, Bi, Bl}, dj = uaj (s) ≥ urj = 0. If Bl loses the auction in s then Bi
gets 0 < p(s0) − n. It is therefore sufficient to assume that, either Bl wins
in s as a single winner, or Bl wins in a tie with another agent. If B1 /∈ C,
then 1 = arg max
j 6=l
X(s)jj. By lemma C.3 and lemma C.4, it must hold that
pil + dl = X(s)ll ≥ X(s)11 − 2 = pi1 − 2. Hence, dl ≥ (pi1 − pil) − 2 > 0.
As transfer for all the other agents are non-negative, it follows that di < 0,
which means a negative final utility to Bi in this case. It thus suffices to
consider the case B1 ∈ C. We distinguish between two possible outcomes in
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the auction in s according to the bid b(s). If Bl wins in s as a single winner,
then ual (s) = pil − p(s) + dl. As url = 0, and the offer to move to state s is
accepted in the considered case, we conclude that dl ≥ p(s)− pil. As l 6= 1 it
holds that ua1(s) = d1. Furthermore, as u
r
1 = pi1−p(s0), and the offer to move
to state s is accepted in the considered case, we conclude that d1 ≥ pi1−p(s0).
We conclude that Bi gains di ≤ −dl − d1 ≤ −(p(s) − pil) − (pi1 − p(s0)) ≤
p(s0) + (pil− pi1) < p(s0)−n. It therefore holds that Bi’s utility in this case
is strictly less than p(s0)−n. Finally, the analysis in the case where Bl wins
in a tie in s is similar.
Thus, as in the previous case, we conclude that if Bi, where i 6= 1, is drawn
in the first stage to be the collusion designer, he can achieve p(s0) − n by
forming the grand cartel, and can only gain strictly less by considering any
alternative proposal to form a cartel which is not the grand one. As we
remarked in the previous case, as a function of the strategies of the others, if
the offer to form the grand cartel with B1 as its representative, is accepted
by some Bj 6= Bi, B1 for a 0-transfer payment, or by B1 for a transfer of
−p(s0) + , then Bi would indeed offer these agents a 0-transfer payment
in order to maximize his utility. Offering these lower transfer payments can
gain Bi only more than p(s
0)−n (Up to p(s0)−  in the SPNE point which
is best to Bi as the collusion designer).
As for every state s the considered bidding strategy b(s) is in equilibrium
of a first price auction in this state, and as for every possible collusion de-
signer, there exists an offer to form the grand cartel, which strictly maximizes
his utility, and is accepted by all agents in SPNE, the set of SPNE points
of the game is not empty, and in every SPNE point of the game the grand
cartel forms with probability 1 as claimed.
D Appendix: Existence of SPNE of the collu-
sion game in the presence of externalities
As previously stated in the paper, we restrict agents to pure strategies in
the auction. That is in order to simplify the equilibrium bid analysis in a
first price auction in a market with externalities. Note however, that fol-
lowing this approach prevents us from using Nash’s (1951) result regarding
the existence of equilibrium point in strategic form games with complete in-
formation. Therefore, the existence of SPNE of the collusion game is to be
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proved explicitly.
In addition to proving the existence of SPNE points of the collusion game
in the presence of externalities, we also discuss in the following appendix some
features of such SPNE points, which we use in the proof of proposition 4.3
to demonstrate partial collusion in the presence of externalities.
Lemma D.1. Consider a generic market with externalities and let s =
(C,Bl, d) be a state, such that |B(s)| ≥ 2. There exists an equilibrium bid of
a first price auction in X(s) in which the good does not stay in the possession
of the seller.
Proof. Denote (i1, k1) = arg(j,m) max
m 6=j
(pij − αmj). Such a pair is unique due
to genericity. If there exists a pair of indices g 6= h such that
X(s)gg −X(s)hg > X(s)jj −X(s)gj ∀j 6= g (D.0.1)
then by proposition A.1 there is an equilibrium bid in the state s. Otherwise,
consider two different cases. Assume first that l 6= i1. By lemma 4.1 we learn
that the only difference between X(s) and the original matrix X(s0) may be
the termX(s)ll. Together with genericity, we conclude thatX(s)ll−X(s)i1l ≥
X(s)i1i1 − X(s)k1i1 , otherwise the pair (i1, k1) would be satisfying equation
D.0.1. If l 6= k1, then by the definition of (i1, k1) it holds that for all j 6= l,
X(s)i1i1 − X(s)k1i1 = pii1 − αk1i1 > pij − αlj = X(s)jj − X(s)lj. It follows
that for all j 6= l, X(s)ll − X(s)i1l > X(s)jj − X(s)lj. The pair (l, i1)
maintains equation D.0.1, in contradiction to the case assumption. Hence
l = k1. If X(s)ll −X(s)i1l > X(s)i1i1 −X(s)k1i1 , then again as for all j 6= l
it holds that X(s)i1i1 − X(s)k1i1 ≥ X(s)jj − X(s)lj, we get a contradiction
to the case assumption with the pair (l, i1). We conclude therefore that
X(s)ll−X(s)i1l = X(s)i1i1−X(s)k1i1 , and as l = k1, we get X(s)ll−X(s)i1l =
X(s)i1i1 −X(s)li1 . In addition, by the definition of (i1, k1), for all q 6= i1, k1
it holds that X(s)i1i1 −X(s)k1i1 ≥ X(s)qq− 12(X(s)i1q +X(s)k1q). Therefore,
according to proposition A.3, there is an equilibrium bid in s, where Bi1 and
Bl win the good in tie.
The case l = i1 is handled in a similar way. As we assume that equa-
tion D.0.1 does not hold, and as |B(s)| ≥ 2, there exists i3 6= i1 such that
X(s)i3i3−X(s)i1i3 ≥ X(s)i1i1−X(s)k1i1 . Denote (i2, k2) = arg(j,m) max
m6=j,j 6=i1
(X(s)jj−
X(s)mj), such a pair is unique due to genericity, lemma 4.1, and the case as-
sumption l = i1. It follows that for every j 6= i1, i2, X(s)i2i2 − X(s)k2i2 >
42
X(s)jj −X(s)i2j. Therefore, on one hand it holds that X(s)i2i2 −X(s)k2i2 ≤
X(s)i1i1−X(s)i2i1 ≤ X(s)i1i1−X(s)k1i1 , where the first inequality is a result
of the assumption that equation D.0.1 does not hold, and the second inequal-
ity follows from the definition of (i1, k1). On the other hand it holds that,
X(s)i2i2 − X(s)k2i2 ≥ X(s)i3i3 − X(s)i1i3 ≥ X(s)i1i1 − X(s)k1i1 , where the
first inequality follows from the definition of (i2, k2), and the second from the
definition of i3. Thus, we get an equality. Therefore, by genericity, lemma
4.1, and as i1 6= i2, i3 we conclude that k1 = i2 = i3, and k2 = i1. It holds
therefore, that X(s)i3i3 − X(s)i1i3 = X(s)i1i1 − X(s)i3i1 . Moreover, as in
the previous case, by the definition of (i2, k2), for all q 6= i1, i2 it holds that
X(s)i2i2 −X(s)k2i2 ≥ X(s)qq − 12(X(s)i1q + X(s)i2q). According to proposi-
tion A.3 there is an equilibrium bid in s, where Bi1 and Bi2 win the good in
tie.
Proposition D.2. The set of SPNE points of the collusion game in the
presence of externalities is not empty.
Proof. Let b(s) be a selection of equilibrium bids of the first price auction,
where the good does not stay in the possession of the seller, for every state
s, such that |B(s)| ≥ 2. According to lemma D.1, and lemma A.8, such
a selection exists. For every proposal s = (C,Bl, d) made by Bi, let Bj ∈
C \{Bi} accept the offer if and only if uj(s, b(s)) ≥ uj(s0, b(s0)). It suffices to
demonstrate that for every agent Bi who is selected in the first stage to be the
collusion designer, there exists an offer which maximizes his utility. Let Bi be
the selected designer. If he makes an offer that gets rejected, or by proposing
s0, he gains ui(s
0, b(s0)). If he offers to move to a state s = (C,Bl, d), the
offer is accepted and Bl does not win the auction, he gains a value in the set
{αki}k 6=i ∪ {0}. Both scenarios yield a finite set of potential utilities for Bi.
Therefore, it suffices to demonstrate that the set of offers which may
be profitable for Bi (i.e., can gain him more than his worst externality,
min{0,min
k 6=i
αki}), may be accepted by the addressed agents, and where Bl
indeed wins the auction in the state s, is finite. If so, then there exists an
offer in this set which maximizes Bi’s utility under these assumptions, and
therefore there exists an offer which maximizes his utility in general.
Due to the fact that transfer payments are  discrete and balanced, it
suffices to demonstrate that for every agent Bj there exists a threshold dj,
such that Bj ∈ C \ {Bi} rejects any offer where dj < dj, and Bi does not
propose an offer where di < di. We claim that if Bl wins as a single winner
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then the required threshold is given by dj = min
k 6=j
αkj − pij. The analysis for
the case where Bl wins in a tie is similar. Indeed, if Bj ∈ C \ {Bi} accepts
an offer to move to a state s where Bl wins as a single winner, he gains at
most pij + dj. If dj < dj = min
k 6=j
αkj − pij, then he gains strictly less than
pij + dj = pij + min
k 6=j
αkj − pij = min
k 6=j
αkj. He can profitably deviate by refusing
the offer, and gain at least min
k 6=j
αkj, as in s
0 the good does not stay in the
possession of the seller. In the same manner, if Bi offers to move to a state s
where Bl wins as a single winner, he gains at most pii+di. Following the same
calculation, if di < di he gains strictly less than min
k 6=i
αki, where by deviating
and proposing s0 he gains at least min
k 6=i
αki.
Corollary D.3. Consider a generic market with externalities, and let b(s)
be a function which maps every state to an equilibrium bid of the first price
auction in this state. There exists an SPNE of the collusion game in which
agents bid in the auction in every state s according to b(s), and for every
proposal s = (C,Bl, d) made by Bi, every Bj ∈ C \ {Bi} accepts the offer if
and only if uj(s, b(s)) ≥ uj(s0, b(s0)).
E Appendix: Proof of non-efficiency in the
presence of externalities
Proof of proposition 5.2. Consider the following 5-player market with exter-
nalities: pi1 = pi2 = pi5 = 1, pi3 = 6, pi4 = 2, α14 = α15 = α51 = α52 = α53 =
α54 = −1, α21 = −4, α24 = 2, α25 = 1, α34 = −10, α42 = −20, and all other
externalities are null. Let B1 be the collusion designer in the beginning of
the second stage.
1 0 0 -1 -1
-4 1 0 2 1
0 0 6 -10 0
0 -20 0 2 0
-1 -1 -1 -1 1
This market is clearly non-generic, but we can change the valuations and
externalities a little to get a generic market in which the same analysis holds
(see also footnote 15). σ is a probability vector, such that B1 is the collusion
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designer with a positive probability, σ1 > 0. We consider the following
strategies of the agents:
• In the state s0, agents bid b(s0) = (5− , 6, 6− 2, 6− , 2− ). That is
an equilibrium bid of the first price auction in the state s0, according
to corollary A.2.
• In the state s1 = ({B1, B2, B3}, B1, d1), where d11 = 5, d12 = −5, d13 = 0
1 4 5
1 6 -1 -1
4 0 2 0
5 -1 -1 1
we consider the bid b(s1) = (3, 0, 0, 3− , 2− ), which is in equilibrium
by corollary A.2.
• In every state s 6= s0, s1, such that |B(s)| ≥ 2 and there exists a unique
pair of indices (i, k) such that
(i, k) = arg(j,m) max
m 6=j∈B(s)
(X(s)jj −X(s)mj)
we consider an equilibrium bid b(s), where Bi wins the auction, and
pays p(s) = max
j 6=i∈B(s)
(X(s)jj − X(s)ij). Such an equilibrium bid exists
according to corollary A.2.
• For every other state s, consider some equilibrium bid b(s), which exists
by lemma D.1, and lemma A.8.
• Finally, with respect to the above described function b(s), for every
proposal s = (C,Bl, d) made by Bi, every Bj ∈ C \ {Bi} accepts the
offer if and only if uj(s, b(s)) ≥ uj(s0, b(s0)).
According to corollary D.3, there exists an SPNE of the game which respects
these strategies. We will demonstrate that the proposal to move to state s1
maximizes B1’s utility as the collusion designer with respect to the considered
strategy profile. AsB3 is the efficient member of the cartel {B1, B2, B3} which
forms in the state s1, and B1 is the cartel bidder in this state, the argument
follows.
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Consider first the initial state s0. As stated above we consider the bid
b(s0) = (5− , 6, 6−2, 6− , 2− ). As a result of this bid, B2 wins the good,
pays p = 6 to the seller, and consumes the good. The utility vector of the
agents is therefore u(s0, b(s0)) = (α21, pi2−p, α23, α24, α25) = (−4,−5, 0, 2, 1).
Consider now the proposal to move the economy to the state s1, where
s1 = ({B1, B2, B3}, B1, d1), and d11 = 5, d12 = −5, d13 = 0. If B2 and B3 accept
the offer then the economy moves to the state s1, where X(s1) is given by:
1 4 5
1 6 -1 -1
4 0 2 0
5 -1 -1 1
where, X(s1)11 = pi1 + d
1
1 = 1 + 5 = 6. We consider the following equilibrium
bid b(s1) = (3, 0, 0, 3− , 2− ). As a result of which B1 wins the auction as
a single winner, pays p = 3 to the seller, and consumes the good. Therefore,
B2 gains α12 + d
1
2 = −5, and B3 gains α13 + d13 = 0, which is equal to what
they gain by rejecting the offer. Hence, B2 and B3 accept the offer in the
considered strategy profile. As a result, by proposing to move to s1, B1 gains
X(s1)11 − p = 6 − 3 = 3. It is clear, that by proposing higher transfers to
B2 or B3, B1 gains less. Moreover, lowering any of the discussed transfer
payments will yield a rejection. The conclusion is that by forming a cartel
with B2 and B3, which is represent by B1, the latter can gain at most 3. It
suffices then to demonstrate that every other proposal will gain him strictly
less than 3.
Note first that in s0 he gains −4, which is indeed strictly less than 3.
Therefore, we should consider only offers which may be accepted in the dis-
cussed strategy profile. Moreover, note that for all j 6= 1, αj1 < 3. It yields,
that we should not consider offers where B1 proposes to move to a state
s = (C,Bl, d), if Bl does not win the auction in s according to the considered
b(s).
We continue by discussing 5 different case, according to the possible iden-
tity of the designated cartel bidder, Bl. We start with the case where
Bl = B1. In order to have Bj 6= B1 to join a cartel C with respect
to the considered strategy profile, it must hold that by accepting the of-
fer, Bj gains at least as much as he does by rejecting it. As we consider
only offers where Bl = B1 wins if the offer is accepted, Bj accepts if and
only if α1j + dj ≥ uj(s0, b(s0)), where dj is the proposed transfer. Equiv-
alently, Bj accepts the offer to join a cartel of which B1 is the represen-
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tative, if and only if dj ≥ uj(s0, b(s0)) − α1j. More specifically, B2 will
accept such an offer if and only if d2 ≥ −5 − 0 = −5, B3 if and only if
d3 ≥ 0 − 0 = 0, B4 if and only if d4 ≥ 2 − (−1) = 3, and finally B5 if and
only if d5 ≥ 1 − (−1) = 2. Since transfers inside the cartel are balanced,
pi1 = 1, and the price paid in the auction in order to win the good is positive,
it follows that by forming a cartel C with himself as the cartel bidder, B1
can gain at most pi1−p(C,B1, d)−
∑
j∈C,j 6=1
dj < 1−
∑
j∈C,j 6=1
dj. In order to gain
at least 3, B1 should therefore consider one of the following cartels only:
{B1, B2},{B1, B2, B4},{B1, B2, B3, B4},{B1, B2, B5},{B1, B2, B3, B5}. Con-
sider first a proposal to form the cartel {B1, B2}. It corresponds to the
updated matrix of externalities X(s):
1 3 4 5
1 1 + d1 0 -1 -1
3 0 6 -10 0
4 0 0 2 0
5 -1 -1 -1 1
As calculated above, d1 = −d2 ≤ 5, and therefore, with respect to the
considered strategy profile, B4 wins in this state and not B1. Hence, such
a proposal cannot yield B1 a utility greater than 3. The same analysis can
be repeated for proposals to form the cartels {B1, B2, B4} and {B1, B2, B5}
with B1 as the representative.
Consider now a proposal to form the cartel {B1, B2, B3, B4} with B1 as its
representative. It corresponds to the updated matrix of externalities X(s):
1 5
1 1 + d1 -1
5 -1 1
As calculate above, d1 = −d2−d3−d4 ≤ 5− 0− 3 = 2. If d1 > 0, B1 wins in
this state with respect to the considered strategy profile, and pays p(s) = 2.
He therefore gains X(s)11 − p(s) = 1 + d1 − 2 ≤ 1 + 2 − 2 = 1, which is
strictly less than 3. If d1 = 0 then there is a tie in this state with respect to
the considered strategy profile. By corollary A.6, the price is at least 2− 2,
hence, B1 gains strictly less than 3. Eventually if d1 < 0, B2 wins. The same
analysis can be repeated for a proposal to form the cartel {B1, B2, B3, B5}
with B1 as the cartel bidder.
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Consider now the case where the designated cartel bidder is Bl = B2. As
calculated in the previous case, in order to have an agent to join a cartel,
B1 should offer him a transfer payment which will guarantee him a utility at
least as high as the utility that he will get if he declines the offer with respect
to the considered strategy profile. As B2 wins the auction and consumes the
good in the state s0, it is clear that no money can be extracted from B3, B4
and B5 in order to form a cartel represented by B2. As B2 gains -5 in s
0,
and his valuation is pi2 = 1, B1 would not be able to extract more than 6
from B2. Hence, whatever cartel B1 forms with B2 as the cartel bidder, if
B2 indeed wins the auction in the new state, B1 gains α21 + d1, which is at
most −4 + 6 = 2.
Consider the case Bl = B3. Following the same analysis, B1 cannot ex-
tract more than 6 from B3, and can extract at most 5 from B2. On the
other hand, B4 will demand at least 12 in order to participate, and B5 will
demand at least 1. It follows that it suffices to consider the following cartels:
{B1, B3},{B1, B2, B3},{B1, B3, B5},{B1, B2, B3, B5}. Consider a proposal to
form the cartel {B1, B3}. It corresponds to the updated matrix of externali-
ties X(s):
2 3 4 5
2 1 0 2 1
3 0 6 + d3 -10 0
4 -20 0 2 0
5 -1 -1 -1 1
Note that in order to gain at least 3, as α31 = 0, it follows that d1 ≥ 3, hence,
d3 = −d1 ≤ −3. Therefore, with respect to the considered strategy profile, it
is B2 who wins the auction, and not B3. Hence, such a proposal cannot yield
B1 a utility greater than 3. The same analysis can be repeated for proposals
to form the other relevant cartels.
Consider the case Bl = B4. B1 cannot extract any money from B4 as
his valuation is equal to the externality he gains in s0. He will need to
compensate B2 for his participation by at least 15, and would not be able to
extract any money from B3 and B5. As α41 = 0, whatever cartel B1 forms
with B4 as its representative, he would not be able to gain a positive utility.
The analysis in the last possible case Bl = B5 is similar.
The conclusion is that the proposal to move the economy to the state
s1 is maximizing B1’s utility with respect to the considered strategy profile.
Therefore, there exists an SPNE in this market, in which with a positive
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probability B1 is the collusion designer, he offers to form a cartel with a
representative who is not its efficient member, and this offer is accepted.
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